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Abstract 
Interpretation bias is often theorized to play a critical role in depression and social anxiety. To 
date, it remains unknown how interpretation bias exerts its toxic effects. Interpretation 
inflexibility may be an important determinant of how distorted interpretations affect emotional 
well-being. This study investigated interpretation bias and inflexibility in relation to depression 
severity and social anxiety. Participants (N=212) completed a novel cognitive task which 
simultaneously measured bias and inflexibility in the interpretation of unfolding ambiguous 
situations. Depression severity was associated with increased negative and decreased positive 
interpretation biases. Social anxiety was associated with increased negative interpretation bias. 
Critically, both symptom types were related to reduced revision of negative interpretations by 
disconfirmatory positive information. These findings suggest that individuals with more severe 
depression or social anxiety make more biased and inflexible interpretations. Future work 
examining cognitive risk for depression and anxiety could benefit from examining both these 
factors. 
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Introduction 
Everyday life is replete with ambiguous social situations. For example, while giving a 
presentation you might notice someone in the audience frowning and wonder, “Was it because 
he disliked what I said, or because he had fought with his partner earlier that day?” At dinner 
following your presentation, you might have heard the people at the next table laughing when 
you sat down and thought, “Were they making fun of me, or simply sharing a more benign joke 
between friends?”. As these potential musings imply, ambiguity in the social sphere is often 
resolved via interpretation. People need to interpret ambiguous social situations to make sense 
of what is happening around them and to understand the implications of these events for their 
own lives. Interpretation is a semantic process that involves integration of different aspects of 
a situation to construct mental representations that resolve ambiguity (Blanchette & Richards, 
2010). How ambiguity is resolved has important consequences for people’s emotional 
experience (Hirsch, Meeten, Krahé, & Reeder, 2016; Wisco, 2009). When characterized by 
consistent emotional distortions, interpretations can play an important role in the onset and 
maintenance of emotional disorders such as depression and social anxiety. 
Accordingly, cognitive models propose that depression (D. A. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 
1999; Ingram, 1984) and social anxiety (D. M. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
may be caused in part by a tendency toward inferring more negative and fewer positive 
interpretations of ambiguous situations. Consistent with this hypothesis, meta-analyses have 
reported medium to large overall effect sizes for interpretation biases in patients diagnosed with 
major depression and individuals with elevated depressive symptoms (Everaert, Podina, & 
Koster, in press; Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010). Interpretation bias in depression is 
characterized by both increased negative and decreased positive interpretations, and particularly 
occurs in response to self-referent information (Everaert, Podina, et al., in press). Also 
consistent with this hypothesis, studies have found that socially anxious individuals draw more 
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negative interpretations when elaborating on ambiguous social information and less positive 
online interpretations at the time of encountering ambiguous cues (Hirsch et al., 2016). 
Importantly, interpretation biases are not mere correlates of depression and social 
anxiety. Research suggests that interpretation biases causally influence symptoms of these 
disorders (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014) and predict their longitudinal 
course (Creswell & O’Connor, 2011; Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 
2010). In sum, biases in interpretation of ambiguous stimuli may represent an important 
transdiagnostic mechanism that cuts across depression and social anxiety. 
One critical question, however, remains: How do interpretation biases exert their toxic 
effects? The impact of interpretation biases on emotional well-being may be influenced by the 
inflexibility with which these biased interpretations are formed and maintained (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010; Stange, Alloy, & Fresco, 2017). Indeed, a tendency towards positive or 
negative interpretations may not be consistently adaptive or maladaptive. Negative 
interpretations may motivate people to adjust their behavior to situational demands. A tendency 
towards positive interpretations may lead people to ignore important aspects of a situation, such 
as problems at work or difficulties in interpersonal relationships. Whether positive or negative 
interpretations promote adaptive behavior hinges on the fluctuating demands of the context in 
which these interpretations are made (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Independent of the 
valence of interpretations, the (in)flexible nature of the interpretation process may determine 
the ‘goodness-of-fit’ between interpretations and changing situational demands, thereby 
promoting adaptive responding or increasing risk for psychopathology. 
Flexible interpretation of ambiguous information involves taking into account multiple 
aspects of a situation and integrating novel information as it becomes available. This process 
balances interpretation with previous and current situational information, and allows someone 
to effectively match his/her responses to continuously changing situations (Mehu & Scherer, 
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2015; Stange et al., 2017). By contrast, inflexible or rigid interpretation involves reduced 
integration of past and current attributes of an unfolding situation. Inflexible interpretation 
therefore hampers the revision of initial interpretations when these interpretations are 
disconfirmed. This reduced sensitivity of interpretation to context may confer risk for 
depression and social anxiety by jeopardizing adaptation to changing contextual demands and 
evoking frequent anxiety, sadness, and/or despair across situations (Mehu & Scherer, 2015). 
Indeed, research has shown that emotional disorders are characterized by inflexible 
responses to the environment in a number of psychological processes. Depression and anxiety 
are related to reduced flexibility in cognitive control (Joormann, 2010; Moran, 2016), causal 
attributions (Stange et al., 2017), and emotion regulation (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010). Interestingly, these inflexible psychological processes have been associated 
with interpretation processes (Everaert, Grahek, Duyck, et al., 2017; Everaert, Grahek, & 
Koster, 2017; Malooly, Genet, & Siemer, 2013). However, it is still unknown how flexible or 
inflexible depressed and socially anxious individuals are when interpreting ambiguous 
information. 
The Present Study 
The present study therefore sought to extend previous research by simultaneously 
examining interpretation bias and inflexibility in relation to depression and social anxiety for 
the first time. To this end, an emotional version of the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence 
(BADE) task (Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006) was developed. The BADE task 
has traditionally been employed to investigate belief revision difficulties in individuals with 
schizophrenia (Speechley, Ngan, Moritz, & Woodward, 2012) and in the general population 
(Bronstein & Cannon, in press). This research has demonstrated that delusional individuals with 
schizophrenia have difficulties in adjusting their initial beliefs based on novel disconfirmatory 
information, suggesting inflexibility in revising beliefs (Sanford, Veckenstedt, Moritz, Balzan, 
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& Woodward, 2014). The BADE task seems particularly suited to examine interpretation bias 
and flexibility for two important reasons. First, the BADE task involves repeated measurement 
of interpretations in response to accumulating information. This enables insight into how 
interpretations dynamically change as ambiguous situations unfold over time. Second, research 
has shown that performance on the original BADE task can be broken into two components 
which relate to interpretation bias and interpretation inflexibility over time (Sanford et al., 2014; 
Speechley et al., 2012). This task feature enables the simultaneous investigation of 
interpretation bias and inflexibility. Utilizing an emotional version of the BADE task, this study 
planned to examine two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Severity of depressive symptoms would be associated with more negative 
and less positive interpretations (Everaert, Podina, et al., in press). With respect to social 
anxiety, greater symptom levels would be related to more negative interpretations (Hirsch et 
al., 2016). No predictions were made regarding the relationship between social anxiety and 
positive interpretations because the lack of a positive bias in social anxiety is typically observed 
in tasks that measure interpretations online (i.e., at the time when ambiguity is initially 
encountered) but not in tasks that allow elaboration (for a review, see Hirsch et al., 2016). The 
emotional BADE task adopts features of both types of tasks: Interpretations are measured when 
situational ambiguity is initially encountered as well as when disconfirmatory information is 
provided to update interpretations about the situation (i.e., requiring elaborate processing). It is 
therefore difficult to predict a priori whether an attenuated positive interpretation bias would be 
evident in socially anxious individuals’ behavior on the emotional BADE task. 
Hypothesis 2: Greater depression severity and social anxiety would be related to greater 
inflexibility in emotional interpretations (Mehu & Scherer, 2015). Higher depression severity 
and social anxiety levels were expected to be related to inflexibility when negative 
interpretations are disconfirmed by novel positive information (i.e., inflexibility of negative 
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interpretations). However, revision of initial positive interpretations in light of novel negative 
information was expected to be intact (i.e., flexibility of positive interpretations). 
Method 
Participants and Sampling Strategy 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to recruit 212 participants 
(demographics: see Table 1). MTurk provides an online crowdsourcing platform with access to 
large and diverse samples suitable for clinical research collecting mental health data (Chandler 
& Shapiro, 2016). Participation in this study was restricted to MTurk users who were 18 years 
or older and lived in the United States. 
Participants were sampled in three waves completed within weeks of one another. A 
gradual oversampling strategy was employed to capture sufficient variation in depressive 
symptom severity. In the first two waves, participants were unselected. In the third wave, 
participants responded to similar advertisements and their eligibility for the study was 
determined using the depression module of the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, 
Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). Participants scoring above the clinical cutoff (sum-scores ≥ 10) 
were specifically recruited in order to sample extreme depression scores. This cutoff has a 
sensitivity and specificity of 88% for major depression (Kroenke et al., 2001). The obtained 
range in depression severity enabled this study to investigate putatively depression-related 
differences in interpretation inflexibility. 
Data Quality Measures 
Following recommendations for research using crowdsourced samples (Chandler & 
Shapiro, 2016), several measures were taken to ensure high data quality. First, only MTurk 
workers with a history of providing good-quality responses (i.e., an acceptance ratio of ≥95%) 
were allowed to participate. Second, two questions were presented during the survey to 
discriminate attentive from inattentive MTurk workers. These questions were presented at 
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irregular intervals and participants were required to correctly answer both. Data from 
participants failing to meet this requirement were not considered in any analyses (n=6). Finally, 
consistent with previous research, participants (n=3) were also excluded from all analyses if 
they completed the survey in less than 60% of the projected time (±20 min). With such 
requirements, research has demonstrated that MTurk data are comparable to those collected in 
the laboratory (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). 
Interpretation Inflexibility 
The emotional BADE task retained the general structure of the original version. As in 
the original task (Woodward et al., 2006), participants were presented with a series of scenarios. 
Each scenario contained three statements. After each statement was presented, participants were 
asked to rate the plausibility of four interpretations of the information in the scenario using a 
21-point rating scale from ‘poor’ (a score of 1) to ‘excellent’ (a score of 21). The interpretations 
were presented in randomized order across statements and participants. Across all scenarios, 
the interpretations could be grouped into three categories (Sanford et al., 2014; Speechley et 
al., 2012): Absurd interpretations (which remained implausible throughout the scenario), Lure 
interpretations (which were initially most plausible but became less plausible after the third 
statement; two different lures were presented in each scenario), and True interpretations (which 
were initially less plausible than the Lure interpretations but became the most plausible after 
the third statement). 
The major change made to the original task in this adaptation was the replacement of 
the scenarios with 24 novel ones that describe common interpersonal situations relevant to 
themes of social failure and rejection. These themes may reflect concerns relevant to depression 
and social anxiety (D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Scenario development 
was guided by ambiguous scenarios utilized in prior research on interpretation biases in anxiety 
and depression (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). These scenarios were substantially modified 
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to create situational descriptions (and corresponding interpretations) that follow the three-
statement structure employed by the BADE task. All scenarios were self-referential. 
Participants were instructed to imagine each situational description as if they could see it 
through their own eyes. 
Two types of scenarios were developed in order to examine whether interpretation 
inflexibility differed according to the valence of initial interpretations relative to that of the 
corresponding disconfirmatory evidence. The first scenario type, disconfirming-the-negative 
scenarios, were initially negative (the first statement) but had a positive ending (the third 
statement). For example, one scenario reads as follows: “The company you are working for 
needs to lay off many employees. You are called in to see your boss” (statement 1), “Your boss 
looks unhappy when you enter his office” (statement 2), “Your boss shares how upset he is 
about having to lay off his employees, and states that he wants you to stay because of your 
collegiality and achievements” (statement 3). In these scenarios, the two Lure interpretations 
were negative in valence (e.g., “Your boss wants you to leave the company because you’re not 
as good as the other employees.”, “The boss will have to let you go because you’re not a great 
fit with the team.”) and the True interpretation was positive in valence (e.g., “The boss wants 
to keep you in the company because you’re one of the better employees.”). 
The second scenario type, disconfirming-the-positive scenarios, were initially positive 
but had a negative ending. For example: “You are telling a joke you recently heard and you see 
the other people’s expressions change” (statement 1), “Everyone looks at each other when you 
get to the end of the joke” (statement 2), “Someone interrupts you and says you are not telling 
the joke the right way” (statement 3). In these scenarios, the two Lure interpretations had a 
positive valence (e.g., “You hear everyone starting to laugh”, “The other people think you have 
a great sense of humor”) and the True interpretation had a negative valence (e.g., “Some people 
think you can’t tell a joke properly”). The two scenario types were presented in randomized 
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order across participants. Figure S1 in the supplemental materials provides an example of the 
flow of scenario events in the emotional BADE task. 
Depression and Social Anxiety Symptoms 
Patient Health Questionnaire – Depression Module (PHQ-9) 
The PHQ-9 (Kroenke et al., 2001) is a brief self-report measure designed for detection 
and monitoring of depression severity. The questionnaire includes 9 items that represent the 
diagnostic criteria for depression from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). On each item, the frequency of the 
symptoms is rated on a four-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). As noted, the 
PHQ-9 was used as a prescreening measure to select individuals with more severe depressive 
symptoms during recruitment. The internal consistency of the measure in this study was α=.94. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) 
The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a widely used 21-item self-report measure 
of depressive symptom severity experienced across the past two weeks. Individuals indicate the 
degree to which they have suffered from a certain symptom on a four-point scale from 0 to 3. 
The BDI-II has overall good reliability and validity (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). The 
BDI-II was used to assess depressive symptom severity in the main part of this study. The 
internal consistency of the BDI-II in this study was α=.96. 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) 
The LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987) is a self-report measure to assess anxiety and avoidance 
of social situations. The questionnaire includes 24 items describing different social situations. 
Respondents rate the extent to which anxiety and avoidance of social situations affected them 
during the last week. The anxiety items are rated on a scale from 0 (none) to 3 (severe) and 
avoidance items are rated on a scale from 0 (never) to 3 (usually). The LSAS has good reliability 
as well as convergent and discriminant validity (Fresco et al., 2001). This study examined the 
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relationship of the social anxiety subscale of the LSAS with interpretation bias and inflexibility. 
The internal consistency of the social anxiety scale in this study was α=.95. 
Procedure 
All participants gave informed consent in accordance with the Yale University 
Institutional Review Board. Participants completed a survey which began with demographic 
questions followed by the emotional BADE task. Participants then completed the BDI-II and 
the LSAS, which were presented in randomized order. Upon completion of the survey, 
participants were debriefed and received remuneration (4 USD). 
Data Reduction and Analysis 
In the original BADE task, interpretation plausibility ratings provided after a statement 
is viewed are averaged across all scenarios. This procedure is repeated for each of the four 
interpretation types (1 Absurd, 1 Lure-A, 1 Lure-B, 1 True). The resulting 12 average ratings 
are then subjected to Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a dimension reduction 
technique that extracts important information from the variance-covariance structure of a set of 
variables to represent the information contained in these variables using a smaller set of new 
composite dimensions, with minimal loss of information. This statistical procedure has been 
commonly applied to analyze original BADE task data (Sanford et al., 2014; Speechley et al., 
2012). In these studies, PCA has reliably yielded two components, which we refer to as 
‘Evidence Integration Impairment’ and ‘Positive Response Bias’ (Bronstein, Dovidio, & 
Cannon, 2017; prior studies have also referred to these components as ‘Evidence Integration’ 
and ‘Conservatism,’ respectively). The first component, ‘Evidence Integration Impairment’, 
reflects the inability to reject implausible interpretations and integrate disambiguating 
information. This component quantifies the rigidity or inflexibility of the interpretation process. 
The second component, ‘Positive Response Bias’1, reflects the degree to which interpretations 
                                                            
1 Please note that the term ‘positive response bias’ is the label used in research using the original BADE task 
(Bronstein & Cannon, in press). It does not refer to response biases that influence the responses of participants 
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that are perceived as plausible are endorsed. This component quantifies biases with respect to 
the content of the interpretations. For the emotional version of the BADE task, the components 
of ‘Evidence Integration Impairment’ and ‘Positive Response Bias’ will be referred to as 
‘Interpretation Inflexibility’ and ‘Interpretation Bias’, respectively. 
To examine inflexible interpretations in the emotional BADE task, PCA with direct 
oblimin rotation (i.e., the extracted components were allowed to be correlated) was conducted 
on the twelve averaged interpretation ratings. This approach was chosen because PCA is a 
powerful data reduction technique that has been applied in prior research with the original 
BADE task (Bronstein & Cannon, in press; Sanford et al., 2014; Speechley et al., 2012). PCA 
was conducted separately for disconfirming-the-negative and disconfirming-the-positive 
scenarios. We expected to find similar PCA solutions as for the original BADE task, with 
components representing ‘Interpretation Inflexibility’ and ‘Interpretation Bias’. The average 
interpretation plausibility ratings were derived for the two scenario types in the same way as 
that described for the original task. Using the components derived from the PCA, multiple 
regression models tested whether interpretation inflexibility and interpretation bias were related 
to depression severity and social anxiety. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Participants’ BDI-II scores (M=15.20, SD=14.03) represented almost the full spectrum 
of symptom severity: 116 respondents reported minimal (range: 0–13), 21 reported mild (range: 
14–19), 35 reported moderate (range: 20–28), and 40 reported severe (range: 29–55) depressive 
symptoms. Significant variation was also found in participants’ scores on the anxiety scale of 
                                                            
away from truthful responses. Please also note that ‘Positive Response Bias’ and ‘Evidence Integration 
Impairment’ are sometimes referred to as ‘Conservatism’ and ‘Evidence Integration,’ respectively (e.g., Speechley 
et al., 2012; Sanford et al., 2014). 
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the LSAS (M=25.97, SD=16.07, range: 0-65). A correlation of .56 (p=.000) was found between 
the BDI-II and LSAS anxiety scale. 
PCA: Extracting ‘Interpretation Bias’ and ‘Interpretation Inflexibility’ 
Table 2 provides the resulting PCA component loadings for both scenario types.2 Note 
that the pattern of the Absurd, Lure, and True interpretation ratings of the emotional BADE 
scenarios conformed to the pattern typical of those that comprise the original BADE task. The 
Supplemental Material details statistics supporting the utility of the emotional scenarios for 
examining interpretation inflexibility in response to disconfirmatory evidence. 
Disconfirming-the-negative scenarios. The PCA with direct oblimin rotation yielded 
a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (.83) suggesting that sampling was adequate for PCA. Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity, χ2(66)=3264.88, p=.000, indicated that correlations between items were 
sufficiently large. All values on the diagonal of the anti-image matrix exceeded .50 (range: .74-
.91), supporting the inclusion of each average interpretation rating in the PCA. Given these 
indications of the validity of using PCA to analyze these data, the eigenvalues were examined 
(all eigenvalues: 5.80, 3.59, 1.19, 0.46, 0.26, 0.20, 0.14, 0.12, 0.08, 0.06, 0.06, 0.04). The scree 
plot and Kaiser’s criterion of one converged on a three-component solution. The first 
component had a similar loading pattern to that of the ‘Evidence Integration Impairment’ 
component repeatedly extracted from original BADE task data (Sanford et al., 2014; Speechley 
et al., 2012). The component consisted of the plausibility ratings for all Absurd interpretations 
as well as the ratings for the negative Lures and positive True interpretation following the third 
statement. This component will be referred to as ‘Negative Interpretation Inflexibility’ (NII) 
because it reflects the inability to reject implausible negative interpretations by integrating 
disambiguating positive information. The second and third component had a loading pattern 
similar to the ‘Positive Response Bias’ component that has also been extracted from original 
                                                            
2 Note that PCAs conducted on random subsamples of the dataset produced the same three-component solutions, 
supporting the reliability of these results. 
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BADE task data (Sanford et al., 2014; Speechley et al., 2012). Both components were therefore 
thought to also capture the degree to which the content of the interpretations was endorsed. 
Given the negative valence of the items loading onto the second component, it will be referred 
to as ‘Negative Interpretation Bias’ (NIB). The NIB component consisted of all ratings for Lure 
interpretations following the first two statements. The third component consisted of all average 
ratings for True interpretations. Given that these were the only items in the scenarios with a 
positive valence, it was concluded that this final component reflected ‘Positive Interpretation 
Bias’ (PIB). The NII, NIB, and PIB components accounted for 48.30%, 29.96%, and 9.87% of 
the total variance, respectively. 
Disconfirming-the-positive scenarios. For disconfirming-the-positive scenarios, all 
values on the diagonal of the anti-image correlations matrix exceeded 0.50 (range: .63-.92) 
except that for ‘True 2’ (the rating for the true interpretation following the second statement), 
which equaled 0.44. Although this suggests a potential sampling issue for this variable, it was 
ultimately included in the PCA because the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (.82) indicated 
adequate sampling adequacy for PCA. Also Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(66)=3398.63, 
p=.000, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA despite the 
inclusion of average True 2 ratings in the analysis. The scree plot and the analysis of eigenvalues 
with respect to Kaiser’s criterion of one justified retaining three components (all eigenvalues: 
6.20, 2.80, 1.53, 0.46, 0.34, 0.18, 0.15, 0.14, 0.07, 0.05, 0.04, 0.03). In combination, these three 
components explained 87.80% of the variance in average plausibility ratings. Again, the first 
component was similar to the ‘Evidence Integration Impairment’ component that has previously 
been extracted from the original BADE task (Bronstein & Cannon, in press). The component 
was dominated by plausibility ratings for the Absurd interpretations and the ratings for both 
positive Lure and negative True interpretations following the third statement. This component 
reflects the inability to reject implausible positive interpretations by integrating disambiguating 
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negative information, and will be referred to as ‘Positive Interpretation Inflexibility’ (PII). The 
second and third component had an identical pattern of loadings to the ‘Positive Response Bias’ 
component of the original BADE task and captured the extent to which the content of 
interpretations was endorsed. The second component consisted of ratings for Lure 
interpretations following the first two statements. Given the positive valence of these items, the 
component will therefore be referred to as ‘Positive Interpretation Bias’ (PIB). The final 
component was comprised of average ratings pertaining to all True items. Given the negative 
valence of these items, this component will be referred to as ‘Negative Interpretation Bias’ 
(NIB). The PII, PIB, and NIB components accounted for 51.68%, 23.35%, and 12.78% of the 
total variance, respectively. 
Relations Among Depression, Social Anxiety, Interpretation Biases, and Inflexibility 
Interpretation biases and inflexibility. Correlations were inspected to examine 
relations between emotional BADE components. Spearman rho correlations were calculated 
because Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests revealed that the distribution of interpretation inflexibility 
scores of the components for disconfirming-the-negative, D(212)=0.23, p=.000, and 
disconfirming-the-positive, D(212)=0.28, p=.000, scenarios did not form a normal curve. 
Supporting the convergent validity of each scenario type’s components, strong correlations 
were found between NII and PII (ρ=.73, p=.000), between PIB components (ρ=.51, p=.000), 
and between NIB components (ρ=.61, p=.000). Within scenario types, PIB was not related to 
interpretation inflexibility (NII: ρ=.07, p=.30; PII: ρ=.12, p=.08) and also NIB did not correlate 
with interpretation inflexibility (NII: ρ=-.08, p=.25; PII: ρ=-.04, p=.61), suggesting both 
constructs are relatively independent. Note that the PCA employed direct oblimin rotation, 
which permits correlations between components. 
Relations with depression and social anxiety. Multiple regression models were tested 
to examine whether interpretation inflexibility and interpretation biases were uniquely 
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associated with variation in depression and social anxiety. Per scenario type, regression models 
were tested separately for depression (BDI-II) and social anxiety (LSAS anxiety) as dependent 
variables. In each model, negative interpretation bias (NIB), positive interpretation bias (PIB), 
as well as interpretation inflexibility (NII or PII depending on the scenario type) were 
simultaneously entered into the regression equation. Assumptions of homoscedasticity and 
normality of residuals were met for all analyses. Collinearity statistics were within acceptable 
limits (VIF’s<1.21, Tolerance’s>.83). Table 3 presents statistics for each tested model. 
Disconfirming-the-negative scenarios. The results of the regression on BDI-II scores 
showed that the three emotional BADE components explained a significant amount of the 
variance, F(3, 208)=4.39, p=.005, R2=.06. With respect to Hypothesis 1, the results showed that 
NIB (β=.19, p=.006) but not PIB (β=-.12, p=.105) was associated with depressive symptom 
severity. In line with Hypothesis 2, NII (β=.19, p=.011) was significantly associated with 
depressive symptoms even when NIB and PIB were included in the regression model.  
Furthermore, the second regression analysis indicated that NII, NIB, and PIB explained 
a significant proportion of the variance in LSAS anxiety scores, F(3, 208)=15.58, p=.000, 
R2=0.18. Regarding Hypothesis 1, NIB (β=.37, p=.000) was uniquely associated with social 
anxiety. Note that the PIB (β=-.13, p=.055) component was not associated with social anxiety. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, NII (β=.28, p=.000) was significantly associated with variation 
in social anxiety levels. 
Disconfirming-the-positive scenarios. When regressing BDI-II scores on PII, NIB, and 
PIB, the results showed that these emotional BADE components explained a significant 
proportion of the variance, F(3, 208)=9.92, p=.000, R2=0.13. With regard to Hypothesis 1, the 
analyses revealed that NIB (β=.22, p=.001) and PIB (β=-.27, p=.000) were uniquely associated 
with variation in depression levels. In line with Hypothesis 2, PII (β=.11, p=.107) was not 
significantly associated with depressive symptom severity. 
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Finally, the results of the regression analysis on LSAS anxiety scores showed that PII, 
NIB, and PIB also explained a significant amount of the variance, F(3, 208)=8.31, p=.000, 
R2=0.11. Regarding Hypothesis 1, it was found that NIB (β=.30, p=.000) was uniquely 
associated with levels of social anxiety. The PIB (β=-.12, p=.070) component was not 
associated with social anxiety levels. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, PII (β=.10, p=.117) was 
not associated with levels of social anxiety. 
Depression vs. social anxiety specificity. Post-hoc analyses were conducted to explore 
the specificity and overlap of depressive symptoms and social anxiety levels in accounting for 
emotional BADE components. A series of commonality analyses (CA) were conducted for 
regression models with BDI-II and LSAS anxiety as predictors of each emotional BADE task 
component (e.g., NII or NIB). For each criterion variable, CA decomposes R2 into three 
variance partitions: (1) variance uniquely explained by BDI-II; (2) variance uniquely explained 
by LSAS anxiety; and (3) variance commonly explained by BDI-II and LSAS anxiety 
(Marchetti et al., 2017; Nimon, Lewis, Kane, & Haynes, 2008). Table S2 in the supplemental 
materials provides the results of the CA. For disconfirming-the-negative scenarios, CA revealed 
that the explained variance in NII and NIB was primarily accounted by LSAS anxiety and the 
common effect of BDI-II and LSAS anxiety. For disconfirming-the-positive scenarios, the 
variance explained in NIB was primarily accounted by BDI-II and the common effect of BDI-
II and LSAS anxiety. These observations suggest that NII and NIB are related to both 
depression and social anxiety, through unique and common variance. 
Discussion 
The results of this study support the hypothesis that depression severity and social 
anxiety are related to greater inflexibility of emotional interpretations. Inflexibility of negative 
interpretations in this study was associated with symptoms of depression and anxiety, which is 
consistent with cognitive models highlighting the importance of interpretation inflexibility in 
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depression (Mehu & Scherer, 2015). This finding suggests that individuals experiencing more 
severe depression and social anxiety levels have difficulties using novel positive information to 
adjust their initial negative interpretations. Interestingly, the analyses also suggested that 
depression and social anxiety levels commonly explained variance in negative interpretation 
inflexibility, suggesting that it may represent a transdiagnostic process that could contribute to 
their comorbidity. Furthermore, as predicted, inflexibility in positive interpretations was not 
related to individual differences in depression severity or social anxiety. This suggests that 
individuals with more severe symptoms of depression or social anxiety do not differ from those 
with fewer symptoms in their ability to revise positive interpretations in the face of novel 
negative information. In tandem, these findings provide evidence for the context-insensitivity 
of initial negative interpretations in both depressed and socially anxious individuals. 
The results of this study also supported the hypothesis that depression and social anxiety 
are characterized by interpretation biases (D. A. Clark et al., 1999; D. M. Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Ingram, 1984; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). It was found that individuals with more severe 
symptoms of depression endorsed more negative interpretations and rejected more positive 
interpretations for disconfirming-the-positive scenarios. In addition, social anxiety was related 
to greater endorsement of negative interpretations. These findings suggest that negative 
interpretation bias may represent a transdiagnostic process, which was further supported by the 
post hoc commonality analyses. These findings are consistent with previous research (Everaert, 
Podina, et al., in press; Hirsch et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, this study suggests that interpretation inflexibility and interpretation bias 
could make independent contributions to depression and social anxiety. Interpretation 
inflexibility and interpretation bias were not interrelated and accounted for unique variance in 
depression and social anxiety. This finding is in line with prior work suggesting that 
attributional style (i.e., tendency to make internal, stable, and global causal attributions) and 
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attributional flexibility (i.e., variability in the type of attributions) independently contribute to 
symptoms of depression (Stange et al., 2017). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
research on anxiety and depression should extend beyond traditional examinations of static 
emotional interpretations. Interpretation is a dynamic process and studying distortions in this 
process over time may provide a complementary perspective to further our theoretical 
understanding of when emotional interpretations promote health or maladaptation (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010; Mehu & Scherer, 2015; Stange et al., 2017). 
In light of this suggestion, the emotional BADE task developed in this study, which can 
be used to simultaneously examine interpretation biases and flexibility, is noteworthy. The 
pattern of interpretation ratings we obtained in the emotional BADE task was broadly consistent 
with that in the original BADE task, supporting its utility for examining interpretation 
inflexibility in response to disconfirmatory evidence. For each scenario type, three components 
(positive interpretation bias, negative interpretation bias, and positive or negative interpretation 
inflexibility) were derived. These components have similar loading patterns to the components 
derived from the original BADE task (see Bronstein & Cannon, in press; Sanford et al., 2014; 
Speechley et al., 2012). Further, strong correlations were observed between conceptually 
similar components across scenario types which supports their convergent validity. These 
results imply that the emotional BADE task is suitable to quantify emotional biases and 
inflexibility in interpretation. 
The suitability of the emotional BADE task for this purpose is fortunate given that it 
represents a promising paradigm for future research. For example, this task may prove useful 
in efforts to identify the cognitive mechanisms involved in inflexible positive and negative 
interpretations. Flexible interpretation, which is a process that integrates various pieces of 
information, relies heavily on working memory. It is therefore likely that cognitive control 
processes which regulate the contents of working memory modulate the interpretation process. 
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In depression, cognitive control is marked by difficulties removing irrelevant negative material 
from working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). Given that prior research linked such 
difficulties to interpretation bias (Everaert, Grahek, & Koster, 2017), it is likely that cognitive 
control difficulties also affect interpretation inflexibility. More specifically, difficulties 
updating working memory contents may cause people to be particularly inflexible when an 
initial negative interpretation is violated by novel positive information. 
The emotional BADE task may also be useful in future research examining 
interpretation inflexibility in relation to emotion regulation difficulties. Depressive and anxiety 
disorders are characterized by the habitual use of rumination and less frequent use of positive 
reappraisal (Aldao et al., 2010). Like interpretation biases (Everaert, Grahek, Duyck, et al., 
2017), negative interpretation inflexibility likely partially accounts for this decrease in positive 
reappraisal (by inducing failure to fully integrate disconfirming positive information) and 
increase in rumination (by causing negative interpretations to persist even in the presence of 
positive information). Because this pattern of emotion regulation strategy use increases 
negative thinking and maintains negative mood states (Joormann, 2010), further examination 
of how interpretation inflexibility might impact rumination and positive reappraisal is a 
worthwhile endeavor for future research. 
Additionally, the emotional BADE task may be useful in investigating how 
interpretation flexibility is related to resilience. Theorists have repeatedly emphasized that 
taking into account different aspects of a situation results in balanced interpretations that allow 
someone to match his/her responses to the needs of that situation (Mehu & Scherer, 2015; 
Stange et al., 2017), thereby encouraging resilience. It can therefore be expected that flexibility 
in both negative and positive interpretations, which may facilitate the integration of information 
discovered over time into a whole that more accurately reflects the situation at hand, is related 
INFLEXIBILITY OF EMOTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS  21 
 
to resilient responses to stressful situations (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Examining this 
expectation provides a further avenue for future research. 
Future research may also build upon the observed valence-specific inflexibility in 
emotional interpretations. While this finding suggests that there is no general deficit in 
interpretation inflexibility related to depression or social anxiety, research should test this 
hypothesis in the context of self-referential BADE scenarios without emotion-laden content. 
Beyond basic research, the emotional BADE task may be useful in applied clinical 
settings. Interpretation biases are a central target in cognitive-behavioral interventions as well 
as cognitive training methodologies (D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Menne-
Lothmann et al., 2014). When assessing the effectiveness of these interventions, it is important 
to know not only what people believe (i.e., the content of their interpretations) but also how 
people revise those beliefs (e.g., via interpretation inflexibility). Given that interpretation bias 
and inflexibility are independent and have unique associations with depression and social 
anxiety, both factors may represent indicators of treatment success. It would therefore be 
interesting to investigate whether the emotional BADE task is useful in predicting treatment 
outcomes, particularly in cognitive behavioral therapy (which includes thought challenging 
exercises that may depend on interpretation flexibility) and cognitive training programs (which 
seek to modify interpretation and attentional bias). Extrapolating from the literature on 
cognitive training (e.g., Vita et al., 2013), it is plausible that these therapies will be more 
effective in those with less inflexible and biased interpretations at baseline. 
Despite these important implications, several limitations of this study should be 
acknowledged. First, this study employed a cross-sectional design which precludes conclusions 
regarding directionality. Multi-wave longitudinal study designs investigating cross-lagged 
relations are better suited to examine how interpretation inflexibility and biases contribute to 
depression and social anxiety, and vice versa. Second, this study found relatively small effects 
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for negative interpretation inflexibility and interpretation biases in relation to depression and 
social anxiety. In accounting for these small effects, it is possible that third variables (e.g., 
cognitive control difficulties) would moderate the relationship between interpretation 
bias/inflexibility and symptoms of psychopathology. For example, depressed people with 
severe cognitive control difficulties may exhibit more rigid negative interpretations than 
depressed people with less severe impairments in cognitive control. Of note, the reported 
significant relations proved reliable as suggested by sensitivity analyses on random subsamples 
of the original dataset. Finally, this study only partly addressed whether negative interpretation 
inflexibility and bias are characteristic of social anxiety and/or depression. The commonality 
analyses examined the ability of unique and shared variance partitions of depression and social 
anxiety to explain negative interpretation inflexibility and bias. Although the results suggest 
that depression and social anxiety may have both unique and shared contributions to these 
outcomes, these results should be interpreted in light of the study’s sampling strategy. The study 
recruited individuals based on their depressive symptoms and the findings may not generalize 
to individuals recruited based on symptoms of social anxiety disorder. To address the issue of 
depression vs. anxiety-specificity, future studies could include multiple groups recruited on the 
presence and absence of clinical symptoms corresponding to each of these disorders. 
Conclusion 
This study advances knowledge of emotional distortions in interpretation in important 
ways. Using a novel version of the BADE task, this study observed that depression severity and 
social anxiety are not only related to interpretation biases but also to negative interpretation 
inflexibility. More severe depression and social anxiety levels were characterized by 
inflexibility in revising negative interpretations in the face of disconfirmatory positive 
information. This finding opens up many exciting lines of research that may engender further 
understanding the cognitive and emotional distortions present in depression and social anxiety.
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics. 
Age (M) 34.26 
(SD=10.39) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
N 
92 
120 
Race 
White or Caucasian 
Black or African American 
Asian 
Latino/a 
Native American or Alaska native 
Other 
 
152 
21 
19 
12 
2 
6 
Education 
High school graduate 
Some college 
Two-year college graduate 
Four-year college graduate 
Some graduate or professional school 
Graduate or professional school graduate 
 
39 
39 
29 
84 
4 
17 
 
Table 2. PCA component loadings per scenario type. 
 Disconfirming-the-negative 
Disconfirming-the-
positive 
 NII NIB PIB PII PIB NIB 
Absurd S1 0.74 0.04 0.33 0.92 0.03 0.13 
Absurd S2 0.77 0.03 0.31 0.93 0.02 0.11 
Absurd S3 0.82 0.03 0.26 0.93 0.01 0.11 
Lure-A S1 -0.07 0.93 0.04 -0.04 0.96 0.04 
Lure-A S2 0.04 0.95 -0.12 0.45 0.71 -0.04 
Lure-A S3 0.90 0.11 0.05 0.94 0.08 0.03 
Lure-B S1 -0.10 0.94 0.03 -0.22 0.95 0.04 
Lure-B S2 0.16 0.95 -0.04 0.23 0.86 -0.05 
Lure-B S3 0.89 0.07 0.12 0.90 0.15 -0.02 
True S1 0.25 -0.10 0.81 0.57 -0.18 0.66
True S2 0.04 -0.03 0.94 -0.04 0.09 0.95
True S3 -0.96 0.18 0.37 -0.85 0.11 0.46
Notes. Pattern matrices are provided; NII=Negative
Interpretation Inflexibility; PII=Positive Interpretation
Inflexibility; NIB=Negative Interpretation Bias;
PIB=Positive Interpretation Bias; S1-S2-
S3=Interpretation rating in response to statement 1, 2,
and 3; Lure-A=This refers to the first Lure
interpretation; Lure-B=This refers to the second Lure 
interpretation; Component loadings higher than .35 are 
in bold. 
 
Table 3. Regression models predicting depression and social anxiety symptoms. 
  BDI-II 
  B SEb β t 95%-CI 
Disconfirming-the negative Constant 15.20 .94 16.15c 13.34; 17.06 
 NII 2.70 1.03 .19 2.57a 0.62; 4.71 
 NIB 2.63 .95 .19 2.75b 0.73; 4.47 
 PIB -1.68 1.04 -.12 1.63 -3.74; 0.35 
Disconfirming-the positive Constant 15.20 .91 16.74c 13.41; 16.99 
 PII 1.50 .93 .11 1.62 -0.31; 3.35 
 NIB 3.14 .92 .22 3.43b 1.31; 4.92 
 PIB -3.84 .92 -.27 4.15c -5.68; -2.04 
  LSAS anxiety 
  B SEb β t 95%-CI 
Disconfirming-the negative Constant 25.97 1.00 25.86c 23.99; 27.95 
 NII 4.51 1.10 .28 4.09c 2.34; 6.70 
 NIB 5.92 1.01 .37 5.82c 3.90; 7.90 
 PIB -2.13 1.10 -.13 1.93 -4.33; 0.03 
Disconfirming-the positive Constant 26.49 1.10 24.06c 24.32; 28.66 
 PII 2.97 1.88 .10 1.58 -0.75; 6.68 
 NIB 4.84 1.06 .30 4.59c 2.76; 6.92 
 PIB -1.95 1.07 -.12 1.82 -4.05; 0.16 
Notes. ap<.05; bp<.01; cp<.001; NII=Negative Interpretation Inflexibility; PII=Positive 
Interpretation Inflexibility; NIB=Negative Interpretation Bias; PIB=Positive Interpretation 
Bias. 
 
Supplemental Material 
Section 1: Flow of scenario events 
Figure S1 below depicts the flow of scenario events. The figure presents the task instructions 
for each statement of an emotional BADE scenario. The different types of interpretations are 
labelled for each statement. Note that the interpretations were presented in randomized order 
across statements. The task and stimuli are available upon request. 
  
Section 2: Descriptive statistics for emotional BADE interpretation ratings 
Table S1 provides descriptive statistics for all average interpretation ratings on the 
emotional BADE task. As anticipated, the plausibility ratings for the Lure explanations were 
significantly higher than average True explanation ratings following the first statement for both 
disconfirming-the-negative scenarios [Lure-A: t(211)=15.64, Bonferroni-corrected p<.001; 
Lure-B: t(211)=15.55, Bonferroni-corrected p<.001] and disconfirming-the-positive scenarios 
[Lure-A: t(211)=16.73, Bonferroni-corrected p<.001; Lure-B: t(211)=19.52, Bonferroni-
corrected p<.001]. Also as expected, average ratings for True explanations were significantly 
higher than those for Lure explanations for both disconfirming-the-negative [Lure-A: 
t(211)=32.06, Bonferroni-corrected p<.001; Lure-B: t(211)=33.95, Bonferroni-corrected 
p<.001] and disconfirming-the-positive scenarios [Lure-A: t(211)=32.83, Bonferroni-corrected 
p<.001; Lure-B: t(211)=31.37, Bonferroni-corrected p<.001]. This pattern of results is 
consistent with that in the original BADE task, supporting the utility of the emotional BADE 
task for examining interpretation inflexibility in response to disconfirmatory evidence. 
 
Table S1. Descriptive statistics for interpretation ratings. 
 
‘Disconfirming-the-
positive’ 
‘Disconfirming-the-
negative’ 
 M SD Min Max M SD Min Max 
Absurd 1 3.44 2.98 1.00 15.50 2.95 3.15 1.00 17.17 
Absurd 2 2.99 2.85 1.00 15.17 2.65 3.00 1.00 15.00 
Absurd 3 2.77 3.13 1.00 17.33 2.47 3.20 1.00 16.58 
Lure-A 1 11.10 3.02 1.67 19.92 10.56 2.77 3.67 20.25 
Lure-A 2 10.71 2.59 3.75 17.58 8.26 2.41 2.00 15.67 
Lure-A 3 4.08 3.13 1.00 15.75 3.06 3.19 1.00 15.33 
Lure-B 1 10.98 2.89 2.25 20.67 12.07 3.14 5.75 20.00 
Lure-B 2 9.98 2.44 3.92 16.50 9.35 2.34 3.33 16.58 
Lure-B 3 3.51 3.03 1.00 15.00 3.94 3.14 1.00 14.58 
True 1 6.45 2.85 1.00 17.50 6.00 2.71 1.00 14.75 
True 2 7.97 2.34 2.08 16.58 9.59 2.46 2.17 15.33 
True 3 17.35 3.39 6.92 21.00 17.61 3.74 1.92 21.00 
Note. Similar pattern of ratings were observed for subgroups of
individuals reporting high and low scores on the depression
(BDI-II) and social anxiety (LSAS anxiety). 
 
  
Section 3: Commonality analyses 
A series of commonality analyses (CA) were conducted for regression models with 
BDI-II and LSAS anxiety as predictors of the dependent variable (i.e., the NII and NIB 
emotional BADE components). For each dependent variable, three variance partitions were 
obtained: (1) the variance uniquely explained by BDI-II; (2) the variance uniquely explained 
by LSAS anxiety; and (3) the variance that can be explained interchangeably by either BDI-II 
or LSAS anxiety. The unique partitions reflect the degree of specificity of a predictor. The 
common partition reflects the degree of overlap of the predictors in accounting for the criterion 
variable. Table S2 presents the results of the commonality analysis. For NII, BDI-II and LSAS 
anxiety scores accounted for 4.43% of the variance. The CA revealed that LSAS anxiety had 
the largest unique contribution (60.5%) whereas the unique contribution of BDI-II was small 
(0.73%). The second largest component was the commonality, that is, the amount of variance 
explained by the BDI-II or LSAS anxiety (38.70%). For NIB in disconfirming-the-negative, 
BDI-II and LSAS anxiety scores accounted for 11.84% of the variance. The CA revealed that 
LSAS anxiety had the largest unique contribution (76.51) and BDI-II had only a small unique 
contribution (0.76%). The commonality was the second largest component LSAS anxiety 
(22.73%). For NIB disconfirming-the-positive, BDI-II and LSAS anxiety scores accounted for 
8.81% of the variance. The CA revealed that BDI-II had the largest unique contribution 
(86.60%) whereas the unique contribution of LSAS anxiety was small (4.71%). The 
contribution of commonality also was rather small (8.69%). 
 
Table S2. Results of the commonality analysis. 
Criterion variable R2 F (p) model Udep Uanx Cdep or anx 
Disconfirming-the-negative      
NII 4.34 F(2, 209)=4.74 
(p=.010) 
0.73% 60.57% 38.70% 
NIB 11.84  F(2, 209)=14.04
(p=.000) 
0.76% 76.51% 22.73% 
PIB 0.18 F(2, 209)=0.18 
(p=.833) 
- - - 
Disconfirming-the-positive      
PII 1.56 F(2, 209)=2.67 
(p=.072) 
- - - 
PIB 6.29 F(2, 209)=7.01 
(p=.054) 
- - - 
NIB 8.81 F(2, 209)=7.94 
(p=.000) 
86.60% 4.71% 8.69% 
Notes. R2 = Total explained variance for the regression model with BDI-II and LSAS 
anxiety scores as predictors in accounting for the criterion variable. The F (p) column 
provides F and p values for the tested regression model; Udep =Variance uniquely 
explained by BDI-II; Uanx =Variance uniquely explained by LSAS anxiety; Cdep or anx 
=Variance that can be explained interchangeably by the BDI-II or LSAS anxiety. 
 
